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The RCEP (“Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership”) is viewed as an alternative to
the TPP (“Trans-Pacific Partnership”) agreement, which included the United States but
excluded China. The RCEP was launched in November 2012, but failed to conclude in
2015, the original agreed-upon deadline. The investment chapter working group contributed to
this delay. For the last four years, the member states have failed to agree on any of the terms in
the investment agreement, instead debating over the modality of the reservation list of the main
text. This reservation list is structured as either a positive or a negative list, however the two
frameworks should yield the same legal consequences in principle. So why do member states have
different preferences regarding the modality of the reservation list? This article employs
behavioral economics to explain why member countries have different preferences regarding the
framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(“RCEP”)1 is a proposed free trade agreement (“FTA”) between the
ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”) (Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the
six states with which ASEAN has existing FTA’s (Australia, China,
India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand). The RCEP
negotiations were formally launched in November 2012 at the
ASEAN Summit in Cambodia, and the 10th round of negotiations
ended in South Korea around early October 2015.
RCEP members originally agreed to conclude all the
negotiations by the end of 2015, but they failed to do so. As of May
2017, they are still in the process of negotiating. Among the many
working groups involved in the negotiations, the investment working
group has showed the slowest progress; its members simply debating
over the framework that should be chosen for listing the reservations
of the investment treaty. That is, for the last four years, they have
done nothing but debate the framework of the reservation list2 and
have agreed on nothing in text.
This raises the question of why host nations (i.e. countries
inviting and receiving foreign investment) pay so much attention to
the framework of the reservation list? They probably do so because
the reservation list is the most realistic and practical instrument that a
1 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (2017), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/
rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx (last visited May
23, 2017).
2 There are two approaches for preparing a reservation list. One is the
negative list approach (“top-down” approach), which lists exceptions to the general
obligation of the main text of a treaty; the other is the positive list approach
(“bottom-up” approach or “GATS” approach), which lists the specific sectors to
which the general obligation applies. An advantage of the positive list approach is
that it gives a greater level of discretion over what to include and when. Politically
sensitive industries can be kept outside the scope of the agreement. The negative
list approach can automatically include new types of investment, while the positive
list approach cannot. See Preserving flexibility in IIA’s: The Use of Reservation,
UNCDAD series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2006.
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host nation can use to carve out regulatory power, given their
tendency for less developed negotiation skills and unequal bargaining
power. The host nations are usually developing nations which do not
have a legal department sophisticated enough to fully analyze and
examine the investment treaties. Moreoever, they lack training
programs and human resources to competently negotiate the treaties.3
The beauty of the International Investment Agreement
(“IIA”) lies in the way it balances the regulatory power of host
nations with investor protection. The host nations do their utmost to
carve out maximum domestic sovereignty, and home nations do their
best to protect their investors.4

3 Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development, and Integration: Innovative
Path for BIT Practice, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L, 299, 302-304 (2014) (explains that BIT
gives home states a negotiating advantage since the party who drafts the model
controls the negotiation. On the contrary, most of the host nations are suffering
from unequal bargaining power and low negotiation skills in a negotiation because
they have not prepared model BITs. Therefore, their position is merely accepting
or slightly modifying to a model BIT prepared by home states’ negotiating partner.
Only a few host states have prepared their model BITs and these are heavily
influenced by the model BIT of home nations); see also M. Sornarajah, The
International Law on Foreign Investment, 207-208 (Cambridge University Press,
2004)(the book points out that it is hard to expect host nations to have a legal
department sophisticated enough to understand and analyze the nuances in the
variations of the terms used in IIA).
4 See e.g. Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of
International Investment Agreements 13 J. INT’L ECON. L, 1037, 1071 (2010)(Argues that
general exceptions clauses and new preambular language provide flexibility. The
article classifies three types of general exceptions clauses found in IIA’s. The new
preambular languages could include some non-investment policy objectives such as
labor or environment protection.); Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development,
and Integration: Innovative Path for BIT Practice, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L, 299, 324 (2014)
(Classifies three types of goals- 1) balance 2) sustainable development 3)
integration- that IIA’s should pursue. The article introduces the idea that the
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (hereinafter “IPFSD”)
emphasizes the insertion of “special and differential treatment (SDT)”. It pointed
out that SDT provisions could be an option where a negotiating party to an IIA has
significantly different levels of development, especially when one of the parties is a
less developed country); Joshua Boone, How Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral
Investment Treaties to Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies 187 GLOBAL BUS. L.
REV.187, 196-7 (2011) (explains the importance of modifying the PerformanceBased Requirement provisions. The article notes that Performance-based
requirements such as technology transfers or limitations to technology licensing
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However, there has been much criticism that many IIA’s
which are being ratified are biased towards investor protection. The
claim is that these ratified IIA’s are being drafted in favor of
protecting investors rather than securing policy spaces in the host
nations. This is due to home nations negotiating based on their
model bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), aiming for a high level
of market opening and liberalization.5 They try their best to persuade
host nations not to deviate from any terms in the Model BIT, and ask
them to carve out as little as possible. The host nations lack the
bargaining power and negotiation skills necessary to modify the
Model BIT and, thus, accept most of the terms therein. It is well

fees are probably the most powerful regulation methods for host nations. These
help to establish new markets, increase efficiency and production within new
domestic markets because they allow for the host nation to use, acquire, produce
and adapt the foreign technology. All these can be done by not prohibiting
performance based requirements through modifying IIA); Markus Wagner,
Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law 36 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 3, 35-53 (2014) (The article compares the WTO dispute settlement system
in cases concerning human, animal or plant life, or health protection with
international investment regimes. The article suggests that international trade and
investment law can offer insights for one another. While international trade has
been more adept at incorporating health or environmental concerns, changes in
IIA’s should close the gap. Particularly, the article argues that such policy space
over health and environmental issues could be done through a provision of
expropriation in IIA).
5 Lei Cai, Where does China Stand: The Evolving National Treatment Standard in
BITs? 13 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE, 373 384 (2012)(addresses how host
nations merely accept the terms in the Model BITs due to their low bargaining
power. “Based on Guzman’s “prisoner’s dilemma” theory, the host nations
compete with each other to attract foreign investment. As a result, they are
frequently at a disadvantaged position with poor bargaining power in the
negotiation process and thereby compelled to accept the model BIT proposed by
the home states”); Amit M. Sachdeva, International Investment: A Developing Country
Perspective 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 533, 547 (2007)(Argues that IIA’s
result in a substantial reduction in regulatory power in host nations. The article
points out that well regulated national policy is what they actually needed. Neo
liberalism policy through IIA leads a reduction of infant indigenous industry and all
of these issues are difficult to overcome by host nations because of their low
bargaining power in IIA negotiation).
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known that most ratified IIA’s are extremely similar in appearance,
and almost identical to the terms in the model BIT.6
On this basis, host nations believe that the reservation list
framework is a practical and realistic solution to carve out and
protect their regulatory powers. Host nations devote meticulous care
to negotiating a reservation list,7 rather than the main text. In
particular, their concerns focus on the framework or modality of the
reservation list.
The framework is either a positive,8 or negative list.9 A
positive list inserts domestic measures that conform to the main
obligations of the treaty, while a negative list inserts non-conforming
measures (i.e. exceptions to the main text), with all other unlisted
measures automatically following the obligations of the main text. In
principle, these two frameworks should yield the same legal
consequences.

6 Huaqun, Supra note 3 at 324 (explains that most BITs follow either the
Draft International Convention on Investments Abroad or OECD 1967 Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. Because of the common
origins, the terms used in BITs look remarkably similar across countries. This
similarity is due to the ‘innate’ priority of home nations and also reflects the
historically weak and passive positions of host nations as contracting parties in
IIA’s); see also Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of
Bilateral Investment Treaties 33 BROOKLYN J. INT’L. L. 405, 415-416 (2008) (explains
that home nations have long been preoccupied with persuading host nations to
provide certain treatments such as MFN, National Treatment, Fair and Equitable
Treatment, which all yield a high level of liberalization).
7 IIA’s consist of two parts: the main text and the reservation list. While
the main text in the IIA’s determine the overall obligations (and rights) of both
parties, the reservation list includes either conforming measures to the obligation of
the main text (positive list) or non-conforming measures (negative list).
8 A positive list approach means the positive listing of sectors, subsectors and individual modes of supply in which countries voluntarily undertake
liberalization commitments. The selective nature of liberalization under this
approach implies that the treaties’ obligations apply only to the activities listed in a
country’s schedule and solely on the terms described therein.
9 Under the negative list, countries agree on a set of obligations in the
main text and list all domestic measures for which such obligations do not apply.
That is, the measures that do not appear in reservation lists are automatically under
the effect of obligations in the main treaty text. Thus, this approach is most
appropriate in countries aiming for a high degree of liberalization.
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To address why this is so, this article employs a behavioral
approach. This article seeks to answer the question of why
negotiators have different preferences regarding the two frameworks.
Fortunately, a few scholars have taken initial steps in determining the
methodological foundations of behavioral international law and
economics,10 and thus have examined how behavioral law and
economics can be applied to international law.11
Using the theoretical foundation of behavioral international
law and economics, this article primarily argues that host nations
strongly prefer a positive list over a negative list as they know that
they have limited cognitive capacities to fully collect and analyze the
existing domestic measures and determine which ones to carve out.
Simply put, they know they are suffering from bounded rationalityin

Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics 55 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 421,421-481 (2014); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1099, 1099-1056 (2015).
11 In fact, the rational choice approach to international law has been
widely accepted and the rational approach was recently applied to the field of
international investment law. However, while the rational choice paradigm has been
thoroughly challenged in the field of economics since the 1970’s and has changed a
significant part of economics, challenges to the rational choice paradigm have not
been systematically explored in the field of international law. . The literature of
international law never responded to this challenges of the rational choice and thus,
there is no systematic analysis of international law using behavioral economics. For
more references in applying rational choice to the field of international law. See
generally Robert E. Scott & Paul Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory
and the Enforcement of International law (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The
Economic Structure of International Law(2008); Eric Posner & Alan O. Sykes,
Economic Foundations of International law(2013), Andrew Guzman, How
International Law works: A Rational Choice Theory(2008); For more reference in
applying rational choice to the field of international investment law, See Anne van
Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract
Theory 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 507 (2009) (argues that Contract theory could be
utilized in IIA’s. The author points out that Contract theory has been applied to
international trade law, but investment law has not yet been applied to IIA’s. IIA’s
may be regarded as a mechanism for overcoming commitment problems between
investors and host nations for mutual and reciprocal benefits. Contract theory deals
with the uncertainty problem and could solve this issue); For more references on
the literature of behavioral economics, See generally, Nick Wilkinson & Matthias
Klaes, An Introduction to Behavioral Economics (2012); Matthew Rabin,
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 11 (1998).
10
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the drafting of the negative list.12 This article does not seek to
present a normative argument regarding the framework that should
be used in BITs, it simply seeks to indicate why negotiating partners
show different preferences regarding frameworks, which in theory,
yield the same legal consequences. In addition, the article does not
pinpoint the types of bounded rationality from which the host
nations are suffering, it merely argues that the negotiators are
experiencing trouble processing the limited information available to
maximize their profits by drafting the reservation list under the
negative list.
II.THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Reservation Lists in IIA’s
A positive approach means there is a positive listing of
sectors, sub-sectors, and individual modes of supply in which
countries voluntarily undertake liberalization commitments. The
selective nature of liberalization under this approach implies that a
treaty’s obligations apply only to the activities listed in a country’s
schedule and solely to the terms described therein.
Alternatively, negotiating partners may utilize a negative list
approach. In this case, countries agree on a set of obligations in the
main text and list all domestic measures for which such obligations
do not apply. That is, the measures that do not appear in reservation
lists are automatically subject to the obligations in the main treaty
text. Thus, this approach is most appropriate for countries aiming for
a high degree of liberalization.
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199 199 (2006); (Bounded rationality, an idea first introduced by
Herbert Simon, refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not
infinite. We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories.
People can respond sensibly to these failings; thus it might be said that people
sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive limitations, minimizing the
sum of decision costs and error costs. To deal with our limited memories we make
lists; to deal with our limited brain power and time we use mental shortcuts and
rules of thumb; but even with these remedies, and in some cases because of these
remedies, human behavior differs in systematic ways from that predicted by the
standard economic model of unbounded rationality. Even when the use of mental
shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable mistakes).
12
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In summary, in a positive list schedule, a party sets out the
sectors it has agreed will be covered by the relevant rules in the main
text and if a sector is not stated in the list, it is not subject to those
rules. In a negative list schedule, a party sets out those sectors or
measures that are not subject to the relevant rules in the main text
and if a sector; activity; or measure is not listed, then it is
automatically covered (unless it has been excluded in the text itself).
In theory, both approaches yield the same result in terms of
liberalization.
1.

Positive List Approach

This approach recognizes four “modes” of trading in
services: across the border (e.g. the Internet); consumption abroad
(e.g. tourism); establishing a commercial presence (foreign direct
investment (“FDI”)); and temporary presence of a natural person to
deliver a service. Governments can make different levels of
commitment for each mode in relation to market access and national
treatment rules.
Sector or sub- Limitations on
sector
market access

Limitations on
Additional
national treatment commitments

8. HEALTHRELATED
SERVICES
Hospital
(1) None
Services (9311) (2) None
(3) Unbound
(4) None
(Registration and
Certification)

(1)None
(2)None
(3)None
(4)None13

Different entries under numbers 1 to 4 indicate the approach
the government is taking to each of the four “modes of supply‟ for
each service. When a country does not wish to limit or restrict market
For a detailed explanation of drafting a positive list, see
http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/CBP/GENERAL%20PRINCIPLES%20&%20GUIDE
LINES%20ON%20SCHEDULING%20SERVICES%20COMMITMENTS.pdf
(accessed May 23 2017).
13
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access or national treatment in a sector or subsector in any of the
four modes of supply, it uses the word “None”, which indicates that
there are “no limitations.” So, for instance, in the chart above, a full
commitment using “None” means the country cannot restrict access
to its market of foreign suppliers who want to supply any aspect of
hospital services (9311) through modes 1 and 2 by using any of the
market access measures that are specifically prohibited. If a country
decides to restrict market access through Mode 3, thereby protecting
the hospital services market, the word “Unbound”, meaning no
bound commitments, is used in the column to block FDI by foreign
investors looking to establish a hospital business.
If a country wants to commit to a sector, but only under
certain circumstances or in a particular way, it needs to clearly spell
out the limitations that it wants to maintain. For instance, if a country
wanted to open the market only with respect to the registration and
certification of the hospital services, it could stipulate that limitation
in a column. In that way, foreign investors with temporary stay
authority would have an opportunity to work in the area of
registration and certification in hospitals. As noted above, the
obligations of the main text apply to the measures that are listed in
the column. If the country decided not to list the hospital services
area, then the government would have no obligations to comply with
the main text with respect to hospital services.
2.

Negative List Approach

Under the negative listing approach, the main features of the
non-conforming measures must be specified in detail. These
measures include the following elements: the economic sector in
which the reservation is taken; the specific industry in which the
reservation is taken; the activity covered by the reservation; the
substantial or procedural obligation to which the reservation is taken
(e.g. MFN or national treatment); and a description of the specific
law, regulation, or other measure for which the reservation is taken.
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The following is an example of a reservation list in the Korea-India
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (“CEPA”).14
Sector

Manufacture of Chemical
Products

Sub-Sector

Manufacture of Biological
Products

Industry
Classification

KSIC 24212 Manufacture of
Biological Products

Type of Reservation

Performance Requirements
(Article 10.5)

Reservation Measure

Pharmaceutical Affairs Act
(Law No. 8552, February. 29,
2008), Article 42
Enforcement Regulations of
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act
(Ordinance of the Ministry of
Health and Welfare No. 71,
October. 16, 2008), Article 21

Description

A person who manufactures
blood products must procure
raw blood materials from a
blood management body in
Korea.15

The above example shows that Korea reserves the right not to
comply with the investment treaty obligations regarding performance
requirements with respect to Indian investors’ manufacturing
chemical products in Korea. Because of this reservation, foreign
manufacturers of blood products in Korea must procure raw blood
materials from a blood management body in Korea, .
The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (the CEPA) is
a free trade agreement between India and South Korea. CEPA was signed on
August 7, 2009. The signing ceremony took place in Seoul and the Agreement was
signed by the Indian Commerce Minister, Sharma, and South Korean Commerce
Minister, Kim Jong-Hoon. The negotiations took three-and-a-half years, with the
first session being held in February 2006. The agreement was passed in the South
Korean Parliament on 6 November 2009. Available at http://commerce.
nic.in/trade/INDIA%20KOREA%20CEPA%202009.pdf (Last visited May 25,
2017).
15 Id.
14
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The negative list may consist of several annexes and
reservations for future measures.16 These may be listed in Annex II
(reservations for future measures), in addition to the current domestic
measures, which are usually listed in Annex I (reservations for
existing measures). Annex II sets out the economic sector and the
activities where new restrictive measures can be implemented in the
future. For example, if a country believes that it may implement some
laws within the steel industry in the future, they would list the sector,
without having to provide any information about domestic measures
in Annex II.
B. Behavioral International Law and Economics
Recent literature has reconciled international law with the
field of behavioral economics to establish behavioral international
law and economics (“BIntLE”). BIntLE is the study of “how states
really behave.”17 It explains how behavioral assumptions may change
the strategies of states and negotiators, as well as the outcomes of
games. Some scholars employ three categories to explain the
foundations of BIntLE: the economic analysis of international law,
behavioral economics, and psychological approaches in international
relations.18The scholars believe that the three areas can complement
each other and reveal new insights into the behavior of actors in
international law. For instance, behavioral economics can enrich the
economic analysis of international law.
16 In addition to Annex I (Reservation for Existing Measures) and Annex
II (Reservation for Future Measures), there are more annexes that can be drafted,
as agreed by negotiating partners. For instance, under NAFTA, Mexico has an
Annex III (Activities reserved to the State) which reserves measures governing the
regulations of activities reserved to the State as decreed in the Mexican
Constitution (primarily in the oil and gas sector). The unique nature of Annex III is
that it has no requirement to specify the exact nature of non-conforming measures
maintained in sectors like Annex II. Another example is the Annex on Exceptions
from MFN. This annex carves out a number of sectors from MFN treatment (as
opposed to individual measures as per Annex I). Thus, this Annex gives greater
flexibility of reservations, allowing host nations to secure whole industries (e.g.
“steel”) without the level of specificity applied to Annex I. For more reference, see
UNCDAD, Supra note 2.
17 Aaken, Supra note 9 at 439.
18 Id. at 424.
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Some caveats with respect to applying individual decision
theory to international law should be discussed as a preliminary
matter because generally, the actor in international law is assumed to
be the state.
The application of behavioral economics to international law
depends on who the actor to be analyzed is. In other words, it is
uncertain whether we could apply individual decision theory to the
state and consider the factors in applying that theory to the
international sphere. There is no clear answer to this problem in
relevant literature since commentators are not sure who really acts in
international law.19 Both international organizations and individuals
contribute to the implementation of international law, but the direct
applicability of individual decision-making is in question. Some argue
that individual decision theory is directly applicable to international
judges, arbitrators, and treaty negotiators since they are individuals. 20
However, others counter by saying that the behavior of elites in
making decisions seems to be different from that of the normal
population, where various types of biases are concerned. This is
because elites tend to have higher levels of trust and cooperation
skills.21 That is, the behavior of judges and treaty negotiators may
differ from that of general participants in the experimental lab.
The application of BIntLE to IIA’s is still at an early stage.
Some analysts have begun research how the proliferation of IIA’s can
be interpreted in the field of behavioral economics. They argue that
host nations’ irrational decisions in signing IIA’s arise from their
“over-optimism” that IIA’s will support their economic growth. 22
They want to believe that signing IIA’s will help attract FDI, which,
in turn, will boost a country’s economy. However, once they face an

Id. at 441.
Id. at 443.
21 See Emily M. Hafner –Burton et al, The Cognition and the Political
Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 369 369 (2013) (Arguing that
experienced policy elites differ from inexperienced subjects in how they make
decisions, rooted in “sophistication,” a learned skill that is derived from experience
and tends to be greater in elite than non-elite populations).
22 Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of
Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 5 (2014)
19
20
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investor-state dispute claim, they may realize that they made their
decisions without any consideration of a cost-benefit analysis.23
Historically, the literature for this subject has never touched
on the application of the behavioral approach to the decision-making
process of investment treaty negotiators. Investment treaty
negotiators are imperfect, irrational human beings and behavioral
economics would have many implications for the negotiations. This
article is the first to raise the behavioral issue in the context of
investment treaty negotiators. The following section will argue that
the bounded rationality problem arises especially when host nations
draft the reservation list in the form of a negative list.
III. APPLYING THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
This section illustrates why home and host nations have
different preferences regarding the reservation list framework. The
first part argues that host nations prefer the positive list to the
negative list because they know that preparing the negative list will
result in self-suffering due to the bounded rationality problem. The
second part of this section examines various real world examples of
how host nations end up with incomplete and defective negative lists,
and their negative consequences when attracting investments. These
consequences explain why host nations avoid the negative approach.
A. Bounded Rationality in the Choice of Reservation List
Framework
Bounded rationality, an idea introduced by Herbert Simon,
refers to the finiteness of human cognitive abilities. People have
limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories, but they
can respond sensibly to these failings. Thus, it could be said that
people sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive
limitations, minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs.
People deal with limited memories, they make lists, and to deal with
23

Id. at 12.
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limited brainpower and time, they use mental shortcuts and rules of
thumb.24
The point of bounded rationality is not that people might
decide differently if they have more information or different
information, or decide differently with different items in the utility
function. Rather, the point is that they would not be able to process
all of the information even if they had it. Thus, if we are to predict
people’s actions, it is not enough to know the amount or quality of
available information, we must also know what the cognitive process
entails for selecting information and choosing rules of thumb.
There are various types of bounded rationality. For instance,
the framing effect25 relates to situations where people favor option A
when a question or problem is posed in one way but favor option B
when the same problem is posed in a different way. The endowment
effect26 is another example of bounded rationality which leads
Jolls & Sunstein, Supra note 12, 199.
The framing effect is an example of cognitive bias in which people
react to a particular choice in different ways depending on how it is presented; e.g.
as a loss or as a gain. People tend to avoid risk when a positive frame is presented
but seek risks when a negative frame is presented. Gain and loss are defined in the
scenario as descriptions of outcomes (e.g. lives lost or saved, disease patients
treated and not treated, lives saved and lost during accidents, etc.). See e.g. Tversky
et al. The Causes of Preference Reversal, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 358-361 (1990); Wansink et
al. Mindless Eating and Healthy Heuristics for the Irrational, 99 AM. ECON. REV 165-9
(2009)(argues that people’s eating habits including quantity consumed, can be
affected by the size of plates, packages or serving bowl used); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE
453, 455 (1981); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping
Bounded Rationality 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 703 (2003).
26 In a traditional sense, the endowment effect is described as one’s
preference to place a higher value on objects one owns relative to objects one does
not own. This is evidenced by the experiment of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler.
In other words, willingness to accept (“WTA”) as a seller is higher than willingness
to pay (“WTP”) as a buyer. Many researchers have conducted experiments that
support this finding using different goods such as wine, chocolates, and basketball
tickets. The most common explanation for the endowment effect is loss aversion.
Simply put, a disutility from losing something is greater than the utility from
acquiring that same thing; therefore WTA is higher than WTP. See generally
Kahneman, D. et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325,1325-1348 (1990); For reference on experiment with wine, See
Van Dijk, E., & Van Knippenberg, D., Trading Wine: On the Endowment Effect, Loss
24
25
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individuals to value goods differently depending on whether or not
they possess them. If they already possess the goods, the individuals
value them higher than they would if they were not in their
possession. In other words, the people who have the goods at their
disposal show greater willingness to pay for them than the people
who do not have them at their disposal.
The “status quo bias” explains that individuals tend not to
deviate from their original positions. Depending on how the default
is set, people make different choices because they simply have a
tendency to not change their decisions.27 Organ donation, for
instance, can be set up on an opt-in (no donation by default) or an
opt-out (donation by default) basis. For example, an empirical study
has shown that an opt-in default leads to fewer individuals making
donations than an opt-out design.28 Last but not least, “overoptimism”29 shows that people are, on average, overconfident about
their future and about their predictions for their future. This relates
not only to their own situations and capacities, but also to their
evaluations of their control over a given situation.
Host nations are well aware of their limited capacity to fully
analyze domestic measures and prepare the optimal reservation list in
the form of a negative list. In order to prepare a negative list, they
should have the full capacity to examine all existing domestic
measures in their nations and precisely determine which measures to

Aversion, and the Comparability of Consumer Goods 19 J. Econ. Psychol. 579, 579-597
(2009); For reference on experiment with chocolate, See Knetsch J.L., The
Endowment Effects and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves 79 Am. Econ. Rev.
1277, 1277-1284 (1989); For reference on experiment with basketball tickets, See
Carmon, Z. & Ariely, D., Focusing on the Forgone: Why Value Can Appear so Different to
Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. Consumer Res. 360, 360-370 (2000).
27 Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
28 Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives? 302 SCI.
1338, 1338 (2003).
29
See generally Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 806 (1980) For more detail on studies of
excess optimism, see Marie Helweg-Larsen & James A. Shepperd, Do Moderators of
the Optimistic Bias Affect Personal or Target Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature, 5
PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 74 74 (2001).
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list. In principle, under the rational choice model, 30 rational
negotiators would easily achieve this maximized result. With their
infinite cognitive ability, the rational negotiators would analyze all the
data and information regarding the domestic measures perfectly, and
distinguish the non-conforming measures without error. They could
produce an optimal reservation list by perfectly examining the
domestic measures without any errors and figure out which one
should be carved out from the present IIA. This optimal reservation
list would maximize the gains of host nations and indicate to foreign
investors exactly which measures had been carved out from the
treaty. The imposition of carve-outs and specificities on the
reservation list would be optimal for attracting foreign investments.
However, host nations know they cannot produce the
optimal reservation list under the negative approach. They fully
recognize the variety of cognitive problems associated with
processing the data and information. They know they have
insufficient information available to create an optimal reservation list
that would maximize domestic profits. The limited access of host
nations to resources makes it difficult to collect all of the required
data and fully predict what measures should be carved-out from the
main text. For example, host nations may face extreme difficulties in
obtaining cooperation from other line ministries.31 Of course, there
The research of applying rational choice perspective under Contract
theory to International law is accelerating. A classic definition of rationality by Gary
Becker: “All human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who
maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets”. The central
principles of Rationality are thus, utility maximization, stable preferences, rational
expectations and optimal processing of information. Applying Rational choice to
international law is basically transferring these principles to collective actors such as
states or international organizations. It is assumed that potential biases cancel each
other out on the aggregate level or do not even occur within corporate actors) See
generally Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers (1989) 14 YALE J. INT L L. 335, 348-54 (discussing
methodology in international relations theory that is relevant for this paper); Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law (1999) 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 1 ; Jack L. GoldSmith & Eric A. Posner, The limits of
International law (2005); Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some
Limits to ‘The Limits of International Law’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289 (2016).
31 People debate whether trade representatives should be placed under
the Ministry of trade (or foreign affairs) or a part of the executive office of the
30
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are exceptions when the negotiation team has strong political power
and is prioritized, such as the United States Trade Representative
(“USTR”),32 which is a part of the Executive Branch of the United
States Government. However, almost all negotiators from host
nations experience difficulties in cooperating with line ministries,
especially with respect to collecting measures for the preparation of a
reservation list. For instance, a negotiation team under a Ministry of
Foreign Affairs or Trade may send a request to the Ministry of Land
to prepare a reservation list, with respect to land measures, because it
has no expertise in this area. However, in many cases, the Ministry of
Land frequently postpones submitting the reservation list to the
negotiation team because it is simply not one of its principal
functions. Thus, even if the domestic measures are easily obtainable
by line ministries, the administrative inefficiencies and lack of
cooperation between ministries may become big hurdles to listing the
measures in the reservation list.
Because of their incapacity to fully analyze and prepare the
reservation list, negotiators frequently fail to insert the reserving
sector that they would otherwise have to insert in the reservation list.
They sometimes leave blank the domestic measures section of the
reserving sector or stipulate unspecified domestic measures such as a
law without specific article numbers.
President. Many suggest host developing countries conduct structure reform of the
trade representative so that it becomes an independent entity under the executive
office of the President see e.g. Kim, supra note 20, at 69 (argues that Korea’s
current negotiation agency under Ministry of Trade lacks: the mechanism through
which the opinions of the interested-party are transmitted to the agency; the
mechanism of checks and balances between the parliament and the agency; the lack
of a horizontal decision-making process. The article ultimately argues that Korea’s
negotiation agency should follow the US model and establish a Korea trade
representative).
32 The USTR is the United States Government agency responsible for
developing and recommending United States trade policy to the President of the
United States, conducting trade negotiations on bilateral and multilateral levels, and
coordinating trade policy within the Government through the interagency Trade
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) and Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG).
Established as the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR) under the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the USTR is part of the Executive Office of the
President. With over 200 employees, the USTR has offices in Geneva, Switzerland,
and Brussels, Belgium. The current U.S. Trade Representative is Michael Froman,
who assumed the office on June 21, 2013.
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These incomplete reservation lists represent a significant loss
for host nations. The unlisted measures may be critical policy
measures that should have been carved-out. The unspecified
measures or blanks in the reservation lists make it difficult for foreign
investors to draw permissible boundaries for their investments, which
can reduce transparency and predictability for foreign investments.
In short, host nations are fully aware of their limited capacity
to conclude a benefit-maximizing reservation list in the form of the
negative list. They also recognize the negative consequences
associated with an incomplete and defective reservation list in the
form of the negative list.
In this regard, the positive list is less burdensome because
host nations do not face any significant pressure in the analysis of
their measures. If they fail to find a measure, the missed measure
does not have to comply with the highly liberalized main text. Thus,
it avoids a high level of liberalizations. There are also no unspecified
or blank measures in the positive list since the positive list does not
require the parties to specify the domestic measures. The positive list
mainly requires the parties to stipulate whether they will open or
close the market in a certain sector.
By contrast, home nations strongly prefer the negative list
because they believe the benefits of such outweigh its costs. Home
nations expect host nations to open more markets in various sectors
of the economy so that their foreign investors can make informed
investment decisions. Knowing that the host nations will fail to
include many economic sectors in the reservation obligations list of
the highly liberalized text, home nations will automatically bind all of
those sectors. They expect all unexamined sectors or measures to
conform to a main text that aims for high liberalization and market
openings.
For instance, if a host nation forgets to list a biotechnology
sector, this is clearly an advantage for the relevant home nations
involved because they know that the sector will automatically
conform to the main text of the treaty, thus achieving high
liberalization and market openings in the host nations. Of course, the
negative list has a downside for home nations being that the
incomplete and defective domestic measures may potentially confuse
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the investors. For example, if host nations successfully insert the
biotechnology sector in the negative list, but fail to put the domestic
measures of the biotechnology sector in the reservation list, foreign
investors have difficulty finding out which exact local rules have been
carved-out. However, home nations generally believe that this is a
minor cost because they anticipate additional benefits from
unexpected market openings within different sectors of the economy,
which the host nations failed to take into account. Moreover, home
nations believe that, to a certain extent, inserting a renegotiation
clause could cure the incomplete and defective domestic measures in
the reservation list. In fact, the home nations frequently include the
renegotiation clause for the host nations to specify and update the
reservation list.33
In this respect, home nations do not prefer the positive list
because their unlisted measures do not have to conform with the
main text of the relevant treaty. Home nations can no longer
anticipate the unexpected market opening from host nations’ failure
to carve-out certain terms that they would get under a negative list
approach.
So far, this article has concluded that host nations prefer the
positive list and avoid selecting the negative list because they suffer
from the bounded rationality problem, which makes it difficult to
examine and identify local domestic measures.
B. Issues with the Negative List – The Incomplete Reservation List
This section illustrates host nations’ poor drafting tendencies
with reservation lists and the negative consequences of such, which
e.g. Trilateral Investment Agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and
New Zealand:
Article 16 Work Program
1. The Parties shall enter into discussions of
(a) schedules of reservations to this Chapter; a
(b) treatment of investment in services which does not qualify as commercial
presence in Chapter 8 (Tradein Services). See also Japan-India Economic
Partnership Agreement:Article 90. Reservation and Exceptions. 5. Each Party shall
endeavour, where appropriate, to reduce or eliminate the exceptions specified in its
Schedules in Annexes 8 and 9 respectively.
33
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in turn, explains why they prefer the positive list. The article will
classify two types of incomplete reservation lists.
The first is the missing measures problem which comes in
two forms, and involves a failure to insert domestic measures. One
way this may occur is through a host nation’s failure to carve out the
economic sector itself, for instance, land acquisitions, so the number
of reservations is less than intended. When this is the case, the host
nation has no way to insert domestic measures with respect to land
measures. The other way this occurs is when, even if they do
successfully carve out a sector, host nations fail to insert domestic
measures in the reservation list. That is, the domestic measures
section of the reservation list is left blank. This type of incomplete
reservation list is the unspecified measures problem. This is the case
when host nations successfully carve out the economic sector and
even insert the domestic measures, but the measures are not clear or
specific enough to draw a clear boundary for permissible
investments.
The third type of incomplete reservation list arises from the
failure to continuously update treaties and their text to reflect any
amendments. Even if host nations successfully carve out the sector
and specify the measures, they frequently fail to reflect the
specifications in the later treaty. This section illustrates these three
types of problems through examples of IIA’s that demonstrate how
incomplete reservation lists negatively impact host nations’ ability to
attract foreign investment. Consequently, this illustration is best
understood by considering why host nations avoid the negative list.
1.

Missing Measures

The missing measures problem is the predominant reason
why host nations choose to avoid using the negative list. The
problem appears when countries leave a blank space in the domestic
measures section for the reserved sector. The following is an example
of missing measures in the Singapore-New Zealand Closer Economic
Partnership (“CEP”):
Sector:

Printing & Publishing
Manufacture & Repair of
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Transport Equipment
Power/Energy
Types of Limitation:

National treatment (Article
29)

Legal Citation:
Description:

More favourable treatment
may be accorded to Singapore
nationals and the permanent
residents in the above
sectors.34

In this reservation list, Singapore tried to carve-out regulatory
power in the area of Printing & Publishing, Manufacture & Repair of
Transport, and Equipment Power/Energy. However, a legal citation
section is missing indicating that Singapore failed to insert the
domestic laws that reflect the reservation, creating many problems.
For one, its absence reduces transparency and predictability for
foreign investors, especially when these investors have no idea what
domestic measures they should look at before making an investment.
Also, the legal consequences of the missing measures are not clear.
Suppose Act A is the law that should be inserted in the above
reservation list. Should this Act A be covered by the main text? The
answer is unclear. One may even argue that Act A is not carved-out
because it was not listed in the reservation list, so it should therefore
conform with the main text. All these uncertainties make it difficult
for host nations to attract foreign investment.
2.

Unspecified Measures

Host nations sometimes insert domestic measures that are
not clear or specific enough. For example in the CEP Singapore
34 The CEP entered into force on 1 January 2001. It is the most
comprehensive trading agreement, outside of the Closer Economic Relations with
Australia, that New Zealand has negotiated. The CEP aims to build on the close
historical ties between Singapore and New Zealand by improving opportunities for
trade in goods, services and investment. The two governments announced their
intention to negotiate an agreement in September 1999 and negotiations were
completed within one year.
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carved out their Companies Act with respect to the establishment,
reporting, and filing of accounts. However, the legal citation is not
clear as the article numbers are missing:
All Sectors
Type of Limitation:

National treatment (Article
29)

Legal Citation:

Companies Act, Cap
50(1994)

Description:

Compliance by Foreign
Companies with the
Companies Act as in
establishing, reporting and
filing of accounts.35

In the present example, the unspecified measures may
have a negative effect for the Governments of both Singapore and
New Zealand. For example the unspecified measures reduce
transparency and predictability for investors from New Zealand, the
main readers of the reservation lists, and thus, the Singapore
Government may have difficulty attracting FDI from New Zealand. 36
New Zealand investors may have difficulty ascertaining legally
permissible boundaries for investments in Singapore. The Companies
Act of 1994 includes all sorts of laws and regulations about
companies, which creates uncertainty in determining whether
Id.
See generally UNCTAD, Transparency (UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements II) (Unite Nation 2012) (The report has a
comprehensive analysis of how IIA could enhance transparency and predictability
for investors. The report examines: the way in which traditional transparency issues
have been addressed in IIA’s since 2004; the emergence of investor responsibilities
as a consideration within transparency issues; and the introduction of a
transparency dimension into investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In analyzing
these issues, this report outlines possible sustainable development implications of
the different transparency-related formulations used in IIA’s and points to some of
the most progressive provisions that are appearing more frequently in investment
instruments. The report reviews transparency regarding investor conduct,
transparency in ISDS, and other obligations that are related to transparency in
IIA’s. This report does not address transparency relating to reservation lists. This
article is the first piece to argue the ways to enhance transparency and predictability
in IIAs)
35
36
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Singapore only carved-out measures related to establishing, reporting,
and filing of accounts. Thus, the question remains: Did the Singapore
Government reserve the right to adopt all of the provisions in the
Companies Act, or just the provisions relating to establishing,
reporting, and filing accounts?
IV. A HYBRID APPROACH AND A RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE
As home and host nations display dramatic differences in
their preferences for reservation list frameworks, it can sometimes be
very difficult to reach a consensus. To resolve the conflict, both
parties often conclude the treaty with a combined approach for
reservation lists: negative and positive. The Australia-Chile FTA is a
good example of such.37 The Agreement first grants market access
for all investments, then adds a reservation list in the market access
column. It is uncertain whether this complex structure really confers
transparency to the measures, but its intent is to combine the best
aspects of both frameworks.
Another method involves simply deciding to renegotiate the
reservation list when host nations have prepared their measures.38
The Australia–Chile FTA is a trade agreement between the countries
of Chile and Australia. It was signed on July 30, 2008 and went into effect in the 1st
quarter of 2009. The FTA is available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/
aclfta/pages/australia-chile-fta.aspx (accessed on Mar 6 2016).
38 Some international agreements are renegotiated while others remain
stable. Despite growing interest in agreement flexibility and design, the literature
has not addressed this question in depth. Some provide a theoretical framework for
explaining why some treaties contain limited duration and renegotiation provisions,
while others are rigid. Others explore the more general question of why states
design agreements with flexibility allowing obligations to be adjusted over time,
temporarily or permanently. The issue of renegotiation in the field of IIA is still in
an early stage. Some argue that the negotiating partners renegotiate when they have
learned something new about the state of the world, for instance faced a investorstate dispute settlement. That is, a direct experience with investment disputes,
which reveals new information about the consequences of the IIA, is associated
with a greater propensity to renegotiate. However, the literature has not examined
in depth why nations renegotiate after the ratification of the treaty. See Koremenos,
Barbara, Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility 55 INT ’ L
ORG . 289 289-325 (2001); Koremenos, Barbara, Contracting around International
Uncertainty, 99 AM . P OL. SCI. REV . 549, 549-565 (2005); Helfer, Lawrence R.
37
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Singapore and New Zealand recognized the problems associated with
unspecified measures in the reservation list, and as a result, put the
following clause in the main text to renegotiate the narrowing-down
of the measures:
Article 32 Limitations
2. As part of the reviews of this Agreement provided
for in Article 68, the Parties undertake to review at
least every two years the status of the limitations set
out in Annex 3 with a view to reducing the limitations
or removing them.
This allows Singapore to narrow-down the measures by
specifying the relevant article numbers. If the stated measures do not
reflect the “description,” then Singapore should reduce or eliminate
such measures in the reservation list.
The following is the renegotiation clause of the trilateral
investment agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand
(“AANZFTA”).
Article 16 Work Programme
The Parties shall enter into discussions on:
(a) schedules of reservations to this Chapter;
and..[…]
3. The Parties shall conclude the discussions referred
to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 within five years from the
date of entry into force of this Agreement unless the
Parties otherwise agree. These discussions shall be

Flexibility Mechanism in International Agreements in International law and
International Relations (Jeffrey Dunoff &Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012); Kal
Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreement, 99 AM . J. INT ’ L L. 581,581614 (2005); Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate
International Agreements? The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Univ. Of Maryland
Presentation Working paper, 2013).
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overseen by the Investment Committee established
pursuant to Article 17 (Committee on Investment). 39
As can be seen above, this is a different renegotiation clause
from the one found in the CEP in the sense that the three parties
signed the treaty without including a reservation list. Australia and
New Zealand successfully persuaded the 10 ASEAN host nations to
choose the negative list, but they all agreed to draft the list after the
ratification of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 states that the three parties
decided to start drafting and to conclude the negotiations on the
reservation list within five years of the ratification of the Treaty.
V. CONCLUSION
In reality, host nation negotiators are not rational agents
because they are just normal human beings. 40 They do not have
sufficient cognitive capacity to accurately examine the measures and
determine which domestic measures should be protected from the
highly liberalized text of a treaty. Because of this, host nations
frequently fail to put domestic measures that should otherwise be
inserted in the negative reservation list. They sometimes fail to insert
the name of a certain domestic measure in the reservation list and
frequently insert unspecified domestic measures (i.e. domestic laws
without article numbering).
Host nations are fully aware that these incomplete and
defective lists, which fall under the negative approach, will have

The AANZFTA was executed on 27 February 2009 and entered into
force on:1 January 2010 – Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,
Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand;12 March 2010 – Thailand;1 January 2011 –
Laos; 4 January 2011 – Cambodia; and 10 January 2012 – Indonesia. (accessed on
Mar 6 2016, at http://www.thaifta.com/engfta/Home/FTAbyCountry/tabid/
53/ctl/detail/id/75/mid/480/usemastercontainer/true/Default.aspx ).
40 Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99,
99 (1955) (argues that individuals do not seek to maximize their benefit from a
particular course of action because they have no capacity to digest all the
information that would be needed to do such a thing. They do not have the
capacity to access all the information required and even if they did, their mind
would not be able to process it properly).
39
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negative consequences. This awareness leads the parties to have
different preferences over the modality of the framework of the
reservation list.
This article is merely the beginning of the efforts to apply the
behavioral approach to international investment law. This article
examined the issues from the perspective of the bounded rationality,
however there are many other issues in the international law regime
that can be described from the behavioral economics viewpoint. For
instance, bounded self-interest may explain the existence of a
question and answer session during the negotiation phase. 41 This
would involve the negotiators from the home nations giving the
negotiators from the host nations brief lectures about the terms of
international investment agreements and answering the questions of
the host nations’ representatives. Why would negotiating partners
cooperate each other, instead of compete each other? Why are the
developed countries so altruistic that they would give a lecture to the
host developing countries? This may be able to be explained from the
perspective of bounded self-interest. More research should be done
in reconciling behavioral economics with international investment
law and international law in general.

41 Surprisingly, for most of the readers of this article, negotiators with
expertise from home nations frequently hold question and answer (Q & A) sessions
parallel to main investment negotiations in order to facilitate the negotiation.
Apparently, this shows a dramatic inequality of bargaining power between
negotiating parties. The Q&A sessions usually consist of discussions about the
meanings of provisions or articles and the consequences of adopting them. The
lecturers - negotiators from home nations- would have the maximum amount of
bargaining power depending on how they shape their Q & A sessions.
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